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Federal Criminal Sentencing: The Case for
Evidentiary Standards
Frank D. Giorno*
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence embody many constitutional
safeguards applicable to the criminal justice system. They carry
forth most clearly the intentions and philosophies inherent in the
American legal system of fully recognizing the innocence of an ac-
cused person until proven guilty. Nowhere is this concept more ap-
parent than in the system's use of a bifurcated trial, which shields
the accused person from highly prejudicial and irrelevant informa-
tion until liability attaches. Yet in the second stage, the sentencing
stage, the various evidentiary protections available during trial on
the merits are usually lost to the offender. In fact, the Federal
Rules of Evidence are specifically nonapplicable once the sentenc-
ing phase begins.' Almost no restrictions exist regarding the admis-
sion of information concerning the background, character and con-
duct of the convicted offender.' Except for the sentencing
procedures prescribed in capital cases,8 where imposition of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Pennsylvania
Military College, 1970; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, 1973; L.L.M., George
Washington University, National Law Center, 1976. Member, Maryland Bar.
I would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of William McCollum, now a gradu-
ate of the University of Baltimore School of Law, for his assistance in the research of this
article.
1. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) provides: "(d) Rules Inapplicable. The rules (other than with
respect to privileges) do not apply in the following situations: . . . (3) Miscellaneous pro-
ceedings. Proceedings for extradition or rendition; preliminary examinations in criminal
cases; sentencing, or granting or revoking probation .... " (emphasis added).
2. A pronouncement against such limitations in the Federal Criminal Code exemplifies
the broad discretion held by the sentencing judge. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 provides: "Use of Infor-
mation for Sentencing. No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the
United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sen-
tence." 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976).
See also United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir. 1976) (use upon sentencing of
a prior conviction for possession of heroin, which had been reversed, allowed because "fact
of possession had been judicially established at a prior hearing").
3. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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death penalty receives strict scrutiny and requires definitive due
process application, very few evidentiary proscriptions exist to pro-
tect the offender in a non-capital case against the admissibility of
adverse information.
Presently, no structured system governs the admissibility of ma-
terial in the sentencing phase of a non-capital case. Instead, great
reliance is placed upon the presentence report, a report required
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." The information
contained in the presentence report is used by the sentencing
judge to evaluate the convicted offender and to determine his pun-
ishment. In addition, the requirement of a presentence report af-
fords the defendant an opportunity to present information in miti-
gation of his crime.5 The convicted offender, however, is not
entitled to disclosure of the presentence report as a matter of
right,' even though the information in the report may be of ques-
tionable reliability and may be totally unrelated to the crime
charged.7 Disclosure is required only if the sentencing judge relied
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1).
5. Peters v. United States, 307 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (imposition of sentence without
benefit of a presentence report, demanded vacating the maximum sentence levied).
6. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
7. See infra note 182. Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969) (presentence
reports are documents which rule 32 does not make available as a matter of right. There are
no formal limitations on their contents, and they may rest on hearsay and contain informa-
tion bearing no relation whatever to the crime with which the defendant is charged). But cf.
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rule 32(c)(3), Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States (Oct. 1981) (this proposal would require disclosure with some exceptions).
See also Maxey v. Benton, 483 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Okla. 1977) (presentence reports may
contain information bearing no relation to the crime charged).
Amendments to Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 32(c)(3)(A) and (B) effective Dec. 1, 1975, were
designed to allow liberalization of disclosure by allowing the defendant to read the
presentence report, except for those parts encompassing sentence recommendation. How-
ever, limitations on disclosure contained within the amended version still leave wide discre-
tion to the sentencing judge. See FED. R. CiuM. P. 32 advisory committee note.
Divergent views among the various circuits as to the requirements of disclosure have
caused inconsistency and nonuniformity of procedures. See, e.g., Knight v. United States,
611 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1979) (criminal defendant not entitled to access to report if counsel
has such access); United States v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1978) (disclosure of
presentence report required only on request of defendant or his counsel, and the court has
discreton to withhold such information which might result in harm to the defendant or
other persons); lacovetti v. United States, 534 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1976) (disclosure of
presentence report rests within discretion of the trial court); United States v. Horsley, 519
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976) (decision of whether to disclose
all or part of the presentence report lies within discretion of trial judge); Brawer v. United
States, 462 F. Supp. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (decision to withhold presentence report from de-
fendant held not to be an abuse of discretion); United States v. Krause, 78 F.R.D. 203 (D.C.
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upon inaccuracies in passing sentence. 8 Yet disclosure of the
presentence report before sentencing is vital because an offender
must know the nature of adverse information to be used against
him before he can refute it."
Thus, even though sentencing has been deemed a "critical stage"
Wis. 1978) (disclosure of presentence reports in criminal cases is to be narrowly circum-
scribed). Compare United States v. Muniz, 569 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1978) (court may not rely
upon undisclosed information in a presentence report unless supported by information per-
suasive of the validity of the charge made) with United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), aft'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980) (dis-
closure of presentence report to defendant or his counsel mandatory).
The unsatisfactory results emanating from rule 32 in its present form have prompted pro-
posed changes that sweep broadly in attempting to provide uniformity. See, e.g., Prelimi-
nary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Commit-
tee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
(Oct., 1981).
In the proposed draft, four important changes are made in subdivision (c)(3) of rule 32:
disclosure of the presentence report is no longer limited to those situations in which a re-
quest is made; disclosure is now provided to both defendant and his counsel; disclosure is
now required a reasonable time before sentencing; and any recommendation as to sentence
is not automatically excluded from the report. These changes were prompted by findings in
a recent empirical study that the extent and nature of disclosure of the presentence investi-
gation report in federal courts under current rule 32 is insufficient to ensure accuracy of
sentencing information. In 14 districts, disclosure is made only on request, and such re-
quests are received in fewer than 50% of the cases. Forty-two of 92 probation offices do not
provide automatic notice to defendant or counsel of the availability of the report, and in 20
districts such notice is given only on the day of sentencing. In 28 districts, the report itself is
not disclosed until the day of sentencing in a majority of cases. Thirty-one courts generally
disclose the report only to counsel and not to the defendant unless the defendant makes a
specific request. Only 13 districts disclose the presentence report to both defendant and
counsel prior to the day of sentencing in 90% or more of the cases. These findings make it
clear that rule 32 in its present form fails to fulfill its purpose. Id. at 50-51 (citing Fennell &
Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of
Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1613, 1640-49 (1980)).
8. See Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1947); United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295
(9th Cir. 1971).
Other cases have announced that a hearing should be held to insure that the sentencing
judge does not rely upon inaccurate information in passing sentence, United States v. Bat-
taglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1972), and that a defendant must at least be advised orally
from the bench of matters of public record that are to be used against him, such as prior
arrest records or charges concerning past alleged offenses. Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d
931 (4th Cir. 1968).
9. This is not to say that the offender is without any recourse because various cases have
held that due process requires that an offender not be sentenced on inaccurate information.
See supra note 8.
Further lines of attack for a convicted offender in federal custody include challenging a
sentence imposed pursuant to a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976), or pro-
testing an increased sentence where the offender was adjudged a dangerous special offender
under 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976), which provides for appellate review of the sentence. Gener-
ally, though, federal sentences imposed within statutory limits are not appealable. Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958).
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of a criminal proceeding,10 entitling the defendant to representa-
tion by counsel, the material that may be entered against an of-
fender is not governed or controlled by any formal rules. Rather,
the offender must rely upon the protections afforded by due pro-
cess, which have been interpreted as not guaranteeing the right of
confrontation or cross-examination in the sentencing phase." The
absence of these rights during sentencing affords the judge broad
discretion in considering the sources and types of adverse informa-
tion used to assess proper punishment.12 Moreover, support for an
exclusionary rule that could be applied to the sentencing stage is
lacking thus far, even with regard to blatant violations of primary
constitutional rights that would readily require exclusion of evi-
dence during a trial on the merits. The articulated rationale for
such a result is that any deterrent effect such exclusionary rule
may have on enforcement officials would be insignificant. 3
10. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). In particular, Townsend v. Burke, 334
U.S. 736 (1948), illustrates the critical nature of sentencing in a criminal case which might
well support by itself a holding that the right to counsel applies at sentencing.
Many lower courts have concluded that the sixth amendment right to counsel extends to
sentencing in federal cases. Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1960); McKin-
ney v. United States, 208 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225
(5th Cir. 1950). See also Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-
Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 806 (1961).
11. The due process approach that can be taken in attacking a sentence imposed based
upon allegedly improper, incomplete or inaccurate information is also not without defect.
Material that scarcely could be held as proper evidence during the guilt determination
stage, may be admitted upon sentencing even if it consists of prior convictions that were
reversed on grounds that illegally obtained evidence was utilized in gaining the prior convic-
tion in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d
1205, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
12. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). But cf. STANDARDS RELATING TO SEN-
TENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 4.4 (Tent. Draft 1967) (recommending that the
substance of all derogatory information be disclosed to the defendant). See also Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (while adhering to the Williams pronouncement, the Specht
court held that denial of confrontation and cross-examination could not be extended to a
proceeding under a state sex offender act, which provided for a new charge leading to in-
creased punishment. Thus, the act closely resembled a recidivist statute, where opportunity
to be heard must be given on the habitual criminal issue).
13. See United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (1976):
We think that if the exclusionary rule were extended to sentencing in the ordinary
case, its additional deterrent effect would be so minimal as to be insignificant.
Generally law enforcement officers conduct searches and seize evidence for pur-
poses of prosecution and conviction-not for the purpose of increasing a sentence
in a prosecution already pending or one not yet begun.
Id. at 1211.
Under this rationale, the net effect of allowing adverse defective information against the
convicted offender at sentencing would give the prosecutor a distinct and subtle advantage
at the expense of the offender's constitutional rights.
878 [Vol. 13
Evidentiary Standards
An examination of various guidelines emerging from the few
statutory provisions and the limited case law produced to date
reveals one very obvious fact: that, except in the capital case, there
exists a very large gap between those evidentiary safeguards appli-
cable to the guilt determination stage and the sentencing stage of a
criminal proceeding. The existence of this disparity is perhaps jus-
tified, but the extremes to which it runs should be questioned.
This article analyzes the federal criminal justice system's sen-
tencing procedures regarding the nonapplicability of formal rules
of evidence and the absence of an exclusionary rule that would ef-
fectively safeguard the rights of a convicted offender. The exemp-
tion of such safeguards, resulting in the admission of adverse infor-
mation, can lead to abuses and may fail to offer necessary due
process protections. This article also examines past and current
sentencing legislation and concludes with a suggested format for
evidentiary restrictions in the sentencing stage of a trial.
CURRENT TRENDS: CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATIONS
Current practices call for the sentencing judge to look to the
offense committed and, more importantly, to the nature of the per-
son who perpetrated the crime in order to assess a proper sentence.
It is believed that society's, as well as the offender's, best interests
will be served by this process. The nature and character of the of-
fender, therefore, becomes preeminent in the sentencing decision.
But in the sentencing phase of a non-capital case, the offender is
not entitled to the full panoply of rights generally accorded in the
guilt determination stage. There exists no right to a jury assess-
ment of proper sentence, nor do reasonable standards regarding
proof of facts apply. In addition, the offender possesses no right to
confront and cross-examine all witnesses who may proffer informa-
tion relative to his potential sentence. 14
The Supreme Court has determined that delving into areas dur-
ing sentencing beyond what would be permissible inquiry during
trial on the merits does not offend the Constitution. 15 Even at the
sentencing stage, however, there are limits as to what constitutes
admissible information. The due process requirement of funda-
mental fairness to the offender during sentencing mandates that
14. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 760 (1980). See gen-
erally STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES, § 4.3(a) and
commentary at 211-12 (1968).
15. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
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the sentencing judge have a full opportunity to assess the of-
fender's character and potential. In addition, due process applies
to the quality of evidence presented to and considered by the judge
at sentencing.16 An ex parte conveyance of prejudicial information,
for example, by the prosecution to a sentencing judge in the ab-
sence of the convicted defendant or his counsel has been held vio-
lative of due process guarantees." Moreover, adverse information
about the offender's prior criminal activity must be accurate, and
sufficient procedural safeguards must be observed so that the of-
fender may test the truth of such information.18
The Supreme Court has also held that special classes of offend-
ers, such as habitual offenders and the mentally ill, must be al-
lowed an evidentiary hearing with the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses before a sentence can be imposed. To
do otherwise would violate due process by sentencing the offender
to a crime for which he was not convicted.' 9 The movement toward
due process safeguards has continued with the Fifth Circuit's find-
ing that minimum safeguards do exist to prohibit reliance upon
erroneous information for sentencing purposes. 20 Thus, the clear
prohibition against the application of formal evidentiary rules dur-
ing sentencing has been buffered somewhat by the decisional law,
which attempts to provide at least some degree of fairness, based
on due process grounds, to the convicted offender. These cases,
however, have created a convoluted backdrop, and yet they stand
as the only guide to controlling a most important phase of the
criminal justice system.
Analysis reveals a need for more substantial approaches to evi-
dentiary concerns during sentencing than those currently available
through case law. The federal circuits have had to fend for them-
selves in fashioning proper rules for the admissibility of evidence
in the sentencing phase. This attempt at "judicial legislation" has
resulted in a lack of uniformity, and misdirects the search for
proper sentencing goals.
16. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1947).
17. Hailer v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1969).
18. Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955).
19. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S, 605 (1967).
20. 481 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1973).
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THE Two-STAGE FRAMEWORK OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL:
COMPARISON OF ADMISSIBILITY SAFEGUARDS
First Stage Safeguards
The structure of the American criminal trial is bifurcated, en-
compassing an initial guilt or innocence determination phase, and
a final punishment or sentencing phase. The first stage is formu-
lated to provide the accused a full, fair, and extensive trial devoted
to the issue of criminal liability. The second phase of the proceed-
ing is devoted to determine an appropriate sentence for the con-
victed offender.2 Underlying this system is the concept that every
defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Various statutory and common law principles govern the sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of the proceedings. The principles
include such important constitutional guarantees as the right
against self-incrimination," the right to counsel,'2 the right to con-
frontation and cross-examination of witnesses,2 4 the right to com-
pulsory process of witnesses,25 the right to trial by jury,2 and the
right to due process of law.2 7 The Constitution protects the indi-
vidual at the time information and evidence is gathered against
him, 8 during his trial, and during confinement after conviction."
Other procedural and substantive provisions ensure proper prac-
tices within the system, including the presentation of adverse in-
formation and evidence against a defendant during the course of
trial,30 at least during the guilt determination stage.3 1
Other preliminary stages, such as the grand jury proceedings, 2
the preliminary hearings3 and arraignment,3 ' have been built into
21. G. MUELLR, SENTENCING PROCESS AND PURPOSE 13 (1977). See also Mueller, Bifurca-
tion: The Two-Phase System of Criminal Procedure in the United States, 15 WAYNE L.
REv. 613 (1969).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV.
28. U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
30. See FED. R. EVID.
31. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3) (specifying that the rules of evidence are inapplicable to
sentencing). See supra note 1.
32. FED. R. CriM. P. 6.
33. FED. R. CrIM. P. 5.1, 7.
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10.
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the criminal justice system to ensure that only those who deserve
prosecution will be subjected to the risk of standing trial. The de-
fendant can curtail or seek to end the proceedings during the pre-
liminary stages of prosecution by presenting motions for dismis-
sal, 85 or by requesting exclusionary hearings 6 which enable him to
examine the evidence-gathering methods employed by law officers.
The defendant can also request mental competency hearings"r to
determine his fitness to stand trial. All of these procedures are
aimed at guaranteeing equality of treatment and fairness to the
defendant.38
Controlling the initial phase of the criminal trial through consti-
tutional and statutory supports ensures that a defendant's guilt or
innocence will be determined by the facts and available evidence
concerning only the crime or crimes for which he stands accused.
For instance, evidence of malevolent character or corrupt back-
ground cannot be used to prove that the defendant acted in con-
formity with such character or background during the first stage of
the trial.39 This is in sharp contrast to allowances made during the
sentencing stage. Forms of evidence deemed generally unaccept-
able for use against a criminal defendant in the guilt determination
stage have been approved for use in the sentencing phase. These
forms of evidence include hearsay, opinion testimony, background
and character evidence, and prior convictions. The theory that one
accused of a crime deserves substantially more protection than one
convicted of a crime derives from a sense of fair play and justice.
Yet is it fair to leave the convicted offender stripped of substantial
constitutional protections at the sentencing phase? The paucity of
evidentiary safeguards available at sentencing leaves too great an
imbalance between the two stages of the criminal trial. Such ineq-
uity is even ironic inasmuch as the sentencing phase has been de-
clared a critical stage of the proceedings.40
35. FED. R. CrIaM. P. 12.
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12, 41(f).
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
38. G. MUELLER, supra note 21, at 5.
39. FED. R. EVID. 404 (a). See Michaelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). But
cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(b ) (allowing evidence of prior bad acts, crimes or wrongdoing if some
special relevance is shown, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake, or accident). See also MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 186-195 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
40. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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The Sentencing Phase: Lack of Adequate Protections
In the second phase of the trial the court must satisfy certain
"correctional-penalogical" requirements. Data concerning the of-
fender's background, and personality become predominant.4 1 With
guilt determination stage safeguards minimally applied, nearly all
evidence bearing upon the offender's past activities may be admit-
ted against him. The offender's reputation, honesty, prior criminal
record, and behavioral and personality characteristics are ex-
amined. The main vehicle for transmittal of such information is
the presentence report, 2 and prohibitions disclosing the contents
of the report can allow inaccuracies to filter into the system. The
judge must sift through the information contained in the
presentence report, including interviews conducted by investiga-
tors with the offender's friends or enemies, employers, fellow em-
ployees, and relatives. Although these interviews contain a great
deal of hearsay information, they constitute a significant part of
the data-base considered by the sentencing judge.42 As a result,
this stage of the proceeding produces the most troubled aspect of
the criminal justice system.
In lieu of an exclusionary rule governing the admission of evi-
dence during the sentencing stage, case law has supplied the only
real guidance through this maze. But criteria regarding sentencing
techniques in the non-capital case vary widely throughout the fed-
eral circuits, and aside from the relatively narrow guidelines delin-
eated by the Supreme Court in Williams v. New York 44 and Town-
send v. Burke,45 the gathering and use of sentencing information
has been left virtually uncontrolled. The Second Circuit in United
States v. Fatico (Fatico J),46 examined the lack of fundamental
rights afforded convicted criminals during sentencing. In Fatico I,
information pointing to the defendant's involvement as a member
of an organized crime syndicate was offered as part of the sentenc-
ing material. This material was presented at the sentencing hear-
ing through the testimony of an FBI agent, who relayed informa-
tion given to him by an "undisclosed informant." The district
court held that this procedure was a "violation of the Due Process
41. G. MUELLER, supra note 21, at 10.
42. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.
43: G. MUELLER, supra note 21, at 12.
44. 337 U.S. 241 (1948). See supra text accompanying note 12.
45. 334 U.S. 736 (1947).
46. 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
1982]
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and Confrontation Clauses of the Constitution because it would al-
low a critical decision affecting liberty, to be made upon informa-
tion gathered from a person that the government was effectively
barring the defendant from examining.' 7 After duly noting that
information concerning a convicted offender's involvement with or-
ganized crime was a very significant factor in determining proper
sentence, the court recognized that due process demands could not
be ignored.48 The Fatico I court examined and rejected the tradi-
tional approach taken in Williams v. New York49 of subjecting the
sentencing stage to only minimum due process scrutiny in order to
allow the broadest range of information gathering. According to
the Fatico I court, the Williams approach amounted to improper
rejection of due process at the sentencing stage.60
In recognizing the need for due process guarantees, the Fatico I
court pointed out that the Supreme Court has in the past ex-
pressed concern regarding the reliability of sentencing informa-
tion.51 The district court noted certain principles that have sur-
faced among the various circuit court decisions regarding
sentencing information: (1) the sentencing judge must be allowed
to consider some hearsay information, although he need not con-
sider all such information as the Williams decision indicates; 2 (2)
misinformation, or materially false information concerning prior
convictions or facts relevant in sentencing will render this process
invalid;53 (3) a mere possibility that misinformation affected a par-
ticular sentence determination can require relief;" (4) if a defen-
dant casts some reasonable doubt upon the reliability of adverse
sentencing information it is not permissible to burden him with
the task of refuting it, even if he cannot show that the information
47. Id. at 1287.
48. Id. at 1289.
49. 337 U.S. 241 (1948).
50. 441 F. Supp. at 1290-91.
51. Id. at 1291-92. The Fatico court cited Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (sen-
tence imposition held improper when trial judge failed to distinguish prior arrest from prior
conviction).
See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (sentence imposed rendered invalid
where reliance was placed upon prior uncounseled convictions obtained in violation of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1971)
(right to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witness held to be one of the "min-
imum requirements of due process").
52. 441 F. Supp. at 1293 (citing United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
53. 441 F. Supp. at 1293 (citing United States v. Malcolm, 432 F.2d 809, 816 (2d Cir.
1970); United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 657 (2d Cir. 1973)).
54. 441 F. Supp. at 1293-94.
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is untrue;"5 (5) substantiation of information should be requested
of the probation department by the sentencing judge as to chal-
lenged information; 6 and (6) judicial discretion is the final safe-
guard lodged within the process. 7
The Fatico I court stressed that because existing formal rules do
not apply sufficient safeguards to sentencing the requirement of ju-
dicial discretion concerning sentencing information is imperative."
The court also examined confrontation clause requirements and of-
fered its suggestions as to why these requirements should apply to
the sentencing stage. 9 After this comprehensive analysis, the court
excluded the sentencing information sought to be introduced by
the government, because it could not be adequately tested by
"meaningful cross-examination. '"60
Judge Weinstein's enlightened opinion was rejected on appeal.61
The Second Circuit, speaking through Judge Oakes, held that it
was erroneous to exclude such testimony during sentencing on the
grounds that the evidence was hearsay and violative of "due pro-
cess and confrontation clause limitations. 6 2 In so finding, the Sec-
ond Circuit stated that since the rules of evidence are not applica-
ble to the sentencing stage, exclusion of evidence based upon
hearsay grounds must of necessity derive from due process or con-
frontation clause restrictions. But although the due process clause
is applicable to sentencing, the court reasoned, it does not require
procedural safeguards after conviction. The court looked to Wil-
liams v. New York6" for support that the judge's need for relevant
information about the offender's background justified limiting due
process protection at sentencing, notwithstanding the potential in-
accuracies that might occur in information from out-of-court
sources. The Second Circuit concluded that a court could deal with
such misinformation, if it does exist, by requiring that it be veri-
55. Id. at 1294.
56. Id. (citing United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1978)).
57. 441 F. Supp. at 1294. See also United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1230 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
58. 441 F. Supp. at 1295.
59. Id. at 1297.
60. Id. at 1299.
61. United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
62. Id. at 708-09.
63. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Williams held that it was not a denial of due process in sentenc-
ing to rely on information supplied by witnesses whom the accused could neither confront
nor cross-examine. Williams does not hold that all hearsay information must be considered.
See United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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fied.64 The court supported its reversal of the order excluding such
evidence by noting that in the instant case the challenged FBI tes-
timony was later corroborated through the testimony of co-con-
spirators, the nature of the crime itself, and other testimony." Fi-
nally, the appellate court held that consideration of the out-of-
court declarations by an unidentified informant were not pre-
cluded where good cause existed for non-disclosure of the inform-
ant's identity and where sufficient corroboration of the material
was apparent. Still, the Second Circuit did not define the extent of
protection afforded by the sixth amendment's confrontation clause
nor the extent to which safeguards could be provided by a hearsay
exclusionary rule and due process protections.6
Upon remand to the district court (Fatico 1/),67 Judge Weinstein
held that, because of the need to "protect critical rights of lib-
erty,"6' the defendant's membership in an organized crime syndi-
cate could support an enhanced penalty if the government could
prove by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence the fact of
such membership. At the same time, however, the opinion stated
that this standard of proof is not a fixed standard for all possible
disputes encountered at sentencing.6 " After finding that additional
proof of the defendant's organized crime involvement was clear
and unequivocal, the Fatico H court increased his sentence from a
maximum three-year term to a four-year term for hijacking. Al-
though the Factico H court determined that the material submit-
64. 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978). Indeed, it is well recognized that materially false
information used in sentencing may invalidate the sentence imposed. See, e.g., United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1947);
United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d
652, 657-58 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Stein, 544 F.2d 96, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1973).
Additionally, a significant possibility of misinformation justifies the sentencing court in
requiring the government to verify the information. See United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110,
121 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 634 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
But when the defendant does not dispute the truth of the statements sought to be intro-
duced, United States v. Bass, 535 F.2d 110, 120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1976), or the statements are
sufficiently corroborated by other evidence, United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 659 (2d
Cir. 1973), hearsay is admissible in sentencing proceedings.
65. 579 F.2d at 713.
66. Id. at 713-14.
67. United States v. Fatico, 458 F Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
68. Id. at 408.
69. Id. at 409. For example, a sentencing judge can generally assume the defendant's
version of a peripheral issue, but as to a more important issue, such as the accuracy of a
recent serious felony conviction, "ease of proof" suggests that the court should require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt if its existence will enhance the sentence.
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ted at the subsequent evidentiary hearing satisfactorily supported
an enhanced sentence, it indicated that courts must in general "re-
main dubious of any conclusions based upon hearsay" introduced
at the sentencing hearing. 0
Although Fatico's sentence was affirmed on appeal,7 the Second
Circuit did not fully endorse the district court opinion, especially
the suggestion that in some sentencing circumstances the burden
of proof should rise to the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard .7
The appellate court reiterated its stance in support of the general
admissibility of hearsay during the sentencing stage, notwithstand-
ing Judge Weinstein's compelling analysis and opinion.73
Fatico P 4 and the tortuous judicial path of uncertainty it fol-
lowed on remand and through a second appeal illustrate an at-
tempt to correct sentencing procedures regarding the admissibility
of evidence traditionally inadmissible during the guilt determina-
tion stage. The case reveals as well a reluctance to surrender the
broad discretionary powers of the sentencing judge. The continu-
ing struggle between due process concerns in the sentencing stage
and the trial judge's need to know and understand the background,
character and potential (either good or bad) of the convicted of-
fender, thus, continues virtually unchecked. With the protections
of the federal rules as to character evidence 75 suspended after the
guilt determination stage, a great potential for disparity at sen-
tencing exists. Consequently, diverse theories of admissibility have
developed and will continue to develop. Although the Supreme
Court, in Townsend v. Burke,7 cautioned the sentencing judge
against relying upon misinterpretations and inaccuracies regarding
a convicted offender's past criminal record and suggested a soften-
ing of the Williams rule, various decisions handed down since Wil-
liams and Townsend indicate that wide disparity still exists.
In Haili v. United States," the sentencing judge stated that he
was not relying upon alleged inaccuracies in the presentence report
in passing sentence, but rather, was basing his decision upon evi-
dence he viewed during the trial and other evidence presented to
70. Id. at 412.
71. United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1979).
72. Id. at 1057.
73. Id. at 1054-55.
74. 441 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
75. FED. R. EVID. 404.
76. 334 U.S. 736 (1947).
77. 443 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1971).
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him. Therefore, no abuse of discretion resulted. In United States
v. Durham,75 a denial of access to a presentence report was upheld,
even though it affected the offender's ability to refute alleged inac-
curacies, in order to preserve the confidential nature of the
report.79
Other courts have viewed the convicted offender's status as one
that requires limiting the sentencing judge's broad discretion to
consider evidence of the offender's prior behavior and potential for
rehabilitation. United States v. Picard,80 for example, held that a
presentence report requires disclosure of its substance. Moreover,
Picard expressed the view that relaxation of the evidentiary rules
and the ability to consider out-of-court, unsworn information dur-
ing the sentencing stage is not unlimited. 1
In keeping with this view, several courts have stated that al-
though disclosure of the entire report is not mandated as a matter
of right, at least the defendant's prior convictions listed in the
presentence report must be disclosed if requested, and if the sen-
tencing judge relied on the convictions in assessing punishment.2
Disclosure is also favored if a heavier sentence were to be levied
after reconviction and during resentencing, in order to protect the
defendant's right to appeal without penalty.8 3 This reasoning was
applied in a case where a far more severe sentence was imposed
after a second conviction, and after the trial judge had examined a
confidential FBI report of an interview with the defendant. The
report, however, was kept from the accused. The appellate court
determined that because of fundamental fairness requirements, the
obligation to disclose exists if the possibility of an enhanced sen-
78. 181 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
79. Id. at 503-04.
80. 464 F.2d 215 (1st Cir. 1972).
81. Id. at 218-20.
82. United States v. Janiec, 464 F.2d 126, 127 (3d Cir. 1972). Accord United States v.
Hodges, 547 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant should be allowed to review presentence
report to be able to refute factual inaccuracies); United States v. Perri, 513 F.2d 572 (9th
Cir. 1975) (fairness dictates that the defendant be apprised of adverse information in the
presentence report relied on by sentencing judge); United States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325
(4th Cir. 1973) (defendant should have an opportunity to refute his designation as the "rin-
gleader of an automobile theft ring"); Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968)
(defendant should be advised, at least orally from the bench, of "such pivotal matters of
public record as the conviction, and charges of crime, with date and place attributed to him
in the report"); United States v. Long, 411 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (disclosure of
information significant to sentencing provides the defendant with an opportunity to correct
error).
83. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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tence is considered.8" Moreover, at least one federal circuit has re-
quired resentencing where the defense counsel had inadequate
time to review an adverse presentence report, even though disclo-
sure was made.8"
Concepts of justice, fundamental rights, and fair play appear to
govern the decision of whether a convicted offender will be granted
access to the specific facts a judge will consider when passing sen-
tence. But it is against the backdrop of Williams v. New York,
Townsend v. Burke, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, and
diverse judicial reaction to disclosure of the presentence report,
whereby the offender may for the first time gain access to adverse
information, that the admissibility of evidence during sentencing
must be considered. This examination will demonstrate the stark
differences in standards operative in the guilt determination stage
and the sentencing stage of the criminal trial.
Hearsay
Hearsay evidence, or evidence procured through out-of-court,
unsworn statements, is generally inadmissible." Yet, under limited
conditions, opinions and conclusions included in the hearsay testi-
mony of laypersons87 may be admitted in the guilt determination
stage. Such evidence is used later, however, to depict a convicted
offender's background during the sentencing stage, where eviden-
tiary controls are lacking. Ostensibly, hearsay evidence is allowed
so as to reveal telling character traits which will provide a firm
basis for rendering proper sentence. Without proper controls on
the use of hearsay in sentencing determinations, however, severe
abuses can result at the expense of the convicted offender's rights
of confrontation and cross-examination, and in contravention of
the standards prohibiting irrelevant, propensity evidence in gen-
eral.88 Moreover, although hearsay evidence is allowed, appropriate
impeachment techniques8 are not available to test the authentic-
ity or accuracy of the evidence as in the guilt determination stage.
Williams v. New York"0 set the tone for broad reliance on out-
84. United States v. McDuffie, 542 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1976).
85. United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1973).
86. FED. R. EVID. 801-806.
87. FED. R. EVID. 701.
88. FED. R. EVID. 401-404.
89. FED. R. EvID. 607.
90. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See also Farrow v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 113 (S.D. Cal.
1975).
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of-court information during sentencing, and provided the basis for
accepting hearsay evidence in most sentencing circumstances. Sev-
eral circuits have followed the Williams appraoch. In United
States v. Cardi," for example, the Seventh Circuit responded to a
defendant's challenge that unsworn, out-of-court information re-
flected his membership in an organized crime syndicate by stating
that:
[T]he sentencing judge is not restricted to evidence derived from
the examination and cross-examination of witnesses in open
court, that may, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, consider responsible unsworn or "out-of-
court" information relative to the circumstances of the crime and
to the convicted person's life and characteristics."
As the Seventh Circuit indicated, reputation will figure very prom-
inently in a sentencing judge's determinations. Thus, membership
or association with organized crime is indeed significant.
In United States v. Strauss," criminal syndicate association was
again accorded great weight in the sentencing decision. In this
case, however, the adverse information was supplied through prior
sworn testimony taken during the course of formal congressional
investigations, where the defendants and their counsels were af-
forded the opportunity of full rebuttal."
In similar situations, at least one court has held that the sen-
tencing judge's reference to adverse testimony given at the defen-
dant's preliminary hearing in a state criminal proceeding did not
constitute a denial of the accused's constitutional rights to be con-
fronted by witnesses against him.' 5 According to this reasoning, the
inherent broad latitude in considering sources of adverse informa-
tion established the propriety of such a reference. In addition,
the mere fact* that government information supplied to the sen-
tencing judge contains hearsay information does not itself require
automatic exclusion even if an objection is raised. In United States
v. Bass,97 for example, highly damaging information revealed by
91. 519 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1975).
92. Id. at 313. Contra United States v. Rao, 296 F. Supp. 1145, 1148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(trial judge discounted from consideration during sentencing the defendant's alleged Mafia
connections).
93. 443 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1971).
94. Id. at 990-91.
95. United States ex rel. Hedge v. Mazurkiewicz, 312 F. Supp. 688, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
96. Id. at 690.
97. 535 F.2d 110 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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government agents concerning the defendant's reputation as a per-
sistent narcotics trafficker was held admissible because the defen-
dant did not deny the allegation when confronted with it." Such a
denial can thus lend reliability to the allegations, notwithstanding
the possibility of material falsity.
Although extensive use of hearsay evidence during sentencing
deliberations has been sanctioned repeatedly, its use is not unlim-
ited. United States v. Weston" set forth guidelines reflecting the
need for more control of hearsay information either through Su-
preme Court pronouncement or through the promulgation of effec-
tive rules of evidence for the sentencing stage. In Weston, the de-
fendant was convicted of possession of a small quantity of heroin
and was given a five-year sentence. After reviewing a presentence
report that was prepared at the request of the prosecution, how-
ever, the judge imposed a sentence of twenty years imprisonment.
The sentencing judge clearly relied upon information contained in
the report. This information, supplied by the government, speci-
fied that the accused was a principal heroin dealer and was guilty
of other serious criminal conduct. The defendant vigorously denied
both allegations. The only foundation for the information was an
unsworn memorandum from a narcotics agent to his superior,
quoting a named informant "previously identified as a reliable co-
operating individual."100 Consequently, the Weston court found
that the memorandum was insufficient to support the very broad
charges of criminality contained in the presentence report. 101 After
outlining both the guidelines set down in Williams, and other case
law precluding consideration of evidence illegally obtained, the
Weston court rejected the practice of considering information with
so weak a foundation. The court also criticized the procedure of
requiring the defendant, after denying the adverse information, to
"disprove" the acts alleged.10 2 Finally, the Weston court called for
an extension of Townsend v. Burke to overturn a sentence imposed
due to information of minimal value, specifying that only substan-
tial and persuasive information should be examined at this impor-
tant stage.102
98. Id. at 120-21.
99. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
100. Id. at 630.
101. Id. at 630-31.
102. Id. at 634.
103. Id. at 634. Cf. United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1973) (sentencing
may take into account statements of an unidentified undercover agent where defendant has
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The weight of authority thus allows hearsay evidence during the
sentencing stage, if ample foundation for its use exists, so that the
judge may have access to all sources of usable information. The
obvious dangers that can befall a defendant who is deprived of
substantial evidentiary safeguards during sentencing indicates that
some modicum of protection should be built into the sentencing
phase to either curtail the extensive use of hearsay or to require an
affirmative showing of reliability when it is so used.
Prior Bad Acts and Convictions
Other than general reputation evidence, nothing is more re-
vealing about a convicted offender's character than a record of
criminal convictions, arrests, or charges against him. As a result,
evidence of prior bad acts is carefully weighed by the judge at the
guilt determination stage and, except for limited purposes of im-
peachment and for proof as to an issue other than an accused's
propensity to commit a criminal act, is inadmissible. 10 4 Similarly,
evidence as to prior convictions must pass strict scrutiny before it
is admitted. 1 5
The admissibility of information concerning a convicted of-
fender's past criminal conduct at the sentencing stage is currently
supported by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32106 and by the
absence of restrictions upon such information under federal proce-
dural guidelines. 1 7 Although the rules allow for almost unlimited
admissibility of information at this stage, decisional law seems to
reach beyond these liberal allowances. Jones v. United States,108
for example, held that prior criminal activity not resulting in a
conviction may be considered during sentencing,109 including in-
dictments for other criminal activity for which the defendant had
not yet been tried. Such indictments were found sufficiently relia-
ble to warrant consideration by the sentencing judge1 0 because
an extensive past criminal record, and where hearsay in the presentence report is corrobo-
rated, substantial, and based upon undisputed facts and admissions. This is true even
though the defendant denies additional or more widespread criminal involvement and even
when no burden is placed on the defendant to disprove the contents of a presentence
report).
104. See Fan. R. Evm. 404.
105. See Fo. R. Evm. 609.
106. FaD. R. Cram. P. 32(c)(2).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976).
108. 307 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
109. Id. at 192.
110. United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972).
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they manifested greater reliability than "unsworn evidence detail-
ing otherwise unverified statements of a faceless informer that
would not even support a search warrant or an arrest."' 1
In United States v. Doyle,"" the dismissal of several other
counts of an indictment under which the defendant pleaded guilty
did not preclude the trial judge from considering the dismissed
counts when the defendant was sentenced."' Yet such
prosecutorial control of the sentencing process can work to the se-
vere disadvantage of the defendant. If the offender is induced to
plead guilty upon the consideration that other counts of an indict-
ment will be dismissed with the allowance that the "dismissed
counts" might be considered upon sentencing, the bargain, though
still advantageous to the offender, gains an added dimension of
which the offender and his counsel should be aware." 4 United
States v. Sweig,"' represents perhaps the most extreme decision
under the liberal application of rules which allow the gathering of
information concerning the offender's past criminal activity. Sweig
held that it was proper to consider at sentencing evidence of
charges in a prior case of which the defendant was acquitted.""
Thus, charges dismissed without prior adjudication, prior crimes
for which the defendant was not tried, dismissed counts on a mul-
ticount indictment, and even charges of which the offender was
previously acquitted have been admitted at the sentencing stage.
The need for more control in this area is obvious, particularly
when contrasted with the notions of admissibility at the guilt de-
termination stage.
One other example that illustrates the lengths to which sentenc-
ing considerations may run under the current system of minimal
guidelines is found in United States v. Cavazos.17 In Cavazos, the
defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of possession with intent to
distribute approximately ten ounces of heroin. During the sentenc-
ing phase, the court was informed that the defendant had no prior
111. Id. at 1142.
112. 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
113. Id. at 721.
114. United States v. Majors, 490 F.2d 1321, 1324 (10th Cir. 1974) (defendant asserted
that his rights were violated when the prosecutor used a dismissed charge of auto theft to
enhance punishment for escape).
115. 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972).
116. Id. at 184. See also Henry v. State, 20 Md. App. 296, 315 A.2d 797 (1974) (the judge
may consider during sentencing "facts" he hears adduced at trial, even though the jury did
not base its verdict on such facts).
117. 530 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1976).
19821
Loyola University Law Journal
record and had never before been involved in criminal activity.
The trial judge, nonetheless, stated that FBI and Bureau of Pris-
ons statistics showed that because an individual had never before
been arrested for criminal activity did not necessarily prove a lack
of prior criminal involvement. The court pointed out that an aver-
age of up to six prior successful criminal acts could occur before a
person was apprehended. These statistics demonstrated to the
court that "a person gets by with ten, fifteen, twenty, sometimes as
many as 200 narcotics sales."'"" The Cavazos judge, in imposing a
maximum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment to be followed by
a special parole term of fifteen years, made it clear that these hear-
say statistics and the nature of the crime itself reflected a "prior
record." 1 9 The court of appeals vacated and remanded for resen-
tencing and stated that:
The use of statistics, even if calculated from a sound base and
placed in proper context, neither of which was shown to have
been done here, is an invalid premise on which to impose sen-
tence. This approach injects hypothetical extraneous considera-
tions into the sentencing process and contradicts the judicially
approved policies of individualizing sentences that are tailored to
fit the offender. 120
Even though relief was granted the offender on appeal in
Cavazos, an obvious potential for abuse exists. This potential could
be alleviated by the promulgation of rules or guidelines broad
enough to give the sentencing judges sufficient information to as-
sess pertinent characteristics of the convicted offender necessary
for proper sentence imposition, yet narrow enough to limit or even
preclude consideration of irrelevant and highly prejudicial data.
Bizarre conclusions which find a prior bad record from the very
absence of past-criminal activity through nebulous, irrelevant, and
unauthenticated statistics or other information during the sentenc-
ing phase could be avoided through such rules and guidelines.
Unlike evidence of prior bad acts resulting in arrest or indict-
ment, evidence of prior convictions in general is relevant to deter-
mining proper sentence. Nevertheless, the use of prior convictions
during sentencing is not free from abuse. In United States v.
Tucker,' a landmark case in sentencing, the Supreme Court held
118. Id. at 5.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 6.
121. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
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that the use of prior uncounseled convictions during sentencing
would seriously and impermissibly erode the rule of Gideon v.
Wainwright,122 that a person may not stand trial for a felony with-
out counsel, unless right to counsel was validly waived. The stance
taken by the Supreme Court in 1972 seems clear and unequivocal.
Yet various circuits have interpreted the Tucker rule differently
when faced with constitutional challenges concerning invalid prior
convictions or the prior dismissal of charges as evidence of previ-
ous misconduct. For example, in reviewing various applications of
the Tucker rule, the court in United States v. Atkins 123 held that
the reversal of a prior conviction did not impair the sentencing
judge's ability to consider the facts underlying the prior over-
turned conviction as long as he considered the constitutional infir-
mity and its effect.
Another area of controversy emerging from varying interpreta-
tions of Tucker concerns the exhaustion of remedies doctrine. The
issue is whether a convicted offender must invalidate his alleged
unconstitutionally obtained prior convictions in the jurisdiction
where the convictions were obtained before beginning an attack in
the federal forum under a habeas corpus challenge." ' The Fifth
Circuit, in Lipscomb v. Clark,1 25 distinguished Tucker by finding
that in Tucker the unconstitutionality of prior convictions had
been adjudicated fully in the state courts, while in Lipscomb only
the defendant's allegations that the prior convictions had violated
Gideon were offered in an attempt to place his prior convictions
within the Tucker rule. The Lipscomb court held, however, that
the mere allegations were sufficient and recommended on remand
for resentencing that set procedures be followed to determine the
extent to which the invalidly obtained prior convictions were con-
sidered in the sentencing of the defendant. First, the district court
was to consider whether treating the prior state conviction as inva-
lid would have prompted the imposition of the same maximum
sentence. If the same sentence would be imposed, the court rea-
soned, then the Tucker rule would be followed. If, however, the
district court found on remand that the prior conviction was un-
constitutional and void, and that the maximum sentence was not
warranted, then the defendant should be able to present evidence
122. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
123. 480 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
125. 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972).
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at an evidentiary hearing that the prior convictions were unconsti-
tutional under Gideon. if the district court found after the hearing
that the convictions were constitutionally invalid, the court stated,
resentencing would then take place.1 26
In Brown v. United States1 27 the Fourth Circuit took an oppo-
site approach to Lipscomb concerning the jurisdictional issue.
Whereas the Lipscomb court stated that the constitutionality of
prior convictions was best handled in the district court on remand,
the Brown court disagreed. Brown held that if state convictions
had been invalidated for want of counsel in habeas corpus actions
also initiated in the state courts, then Tucker would mandate re-
sentencing. If, however, the state convictions had not been at-
tacked in the state courts, then the federal district court could
rightly consider dismissal of a convicted offender's challenge as
premature. 12  Although Brown agreed with the procedures an-
nounced in Lipscomb regarding the need for resentencing where
the judge relied on unconstitutional prior convictions, it rejected
Lipscomb insofar as Lipscomb allowed the federal district court to
determine the validity of the challenged convictions.
The Brown decision appears to place an extremely severe burden
on the offender challenging such convictions and could result in a
procedural logjam at the state and federal levels. 29 As Lipscomb
and Brown demonstrate, a seemingly straightforward rule devel-
oped to promote constitutionally required goals may become
fraught with difficulty when subjected to interpretative nuances
within the various circuits. Current law indicates that even a prior
conviction obtained in violation of Gideon is not totally precluded.
Rather than relying on a codified rule that would eliminate judicial
consideration of such infirm convictions at the sentencing stage,
the convicted offender must accept the judge's word that such
prior convictions will not affect the sentence imposed. Even assum-
ing the judge possesses a requisite sense of fairness, the post-Tuck-
er subjective standard leaves room for concern that the judge's im-
pressions formed during trial will influence his sentencing decision.
An objective rule would help to eliminate much of the judicial
guesswork and hindsight currently pervading the circuits on the
exhaustion of remedies issue. Furthermore, under prevailing inter-
126. Id. at 1323. See also United States v. Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973).
127. 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973).
128. Id. at 118.
129. Farrow v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 113, 118 (S.D. CaL 1974).
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pretations of the Tucker rule, serious hardships can result to de-
fendants who seek to exclude evidence of prior convictions ob-
tained in violation of constitutional rights during the post-
conviction and incarceration period. An objective rule, framed in
conformity with Tucker, could also resolve this current conflict
among the circuits 30 and provide for an evenhanded approach to
this highly provocative and prejudicial evidence that so seriously
affects a convicted offender's liberty.
. USE OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE AT SENTENCING
An interesting conflict exists between the exclusionary rule
which operates at the guilt determination stage to prohibit the in-
troduction of illegally obtained evidence, and the principle which
allows judges wide ranging access to diverse sources of evidence at
the sentencing stage. 13 As previously noted, strict evidentiary
rules do not apply to the sentencing phase where the policy of in-
dividualizing sentences and judicial discretion control.132 Exclu-
sionary rules applicable at trial on the merits comprise two catego-
ries: one affecting evidence obtained through illegal searches and
seizures in violation of the fourth amendment, 33 and the second
affecting improperly obtained statements of the accused in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment.'3 4 Divergent views exist as to whether
such evidence is admissible at sentencing, creating a serious lack of
130. Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263, 1268 n.4 (4th Cir. 1978).
131. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1973). See also Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 856,
858 (1975).
132. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See also Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 856,
858 (1975).
133. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court based the exclusion upon
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to the fourth amend-
ment. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions base such exclusions upon constitutional guar-
antees against self-incrimination and on the theory that it is within the exercise of the
Court's supervisory powers over the administration of criminal justice in the federal judicial
system to develop such rules.
See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the rule announced in Weeks is
applicable to such illegally obtained evidence in state courts); Annot., 22 A.L.R. FED. 856,
858-59 (1975); 29 AM. Jut. 2D Evidence § 411 (1967).
134. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (rendering inadmissible a confession ob-
tained by police for failing to advise accused of rights guaranteed by the fifth and sixth
amendments). See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (rendering inadmissible
damaging statements extracted by police during interrogation); Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957) (rendering inadmissible confessions obtained during illegal detention by
police authorities); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (rendering inadmissible
incriminating statements for failure to bring the accused before a judicial officer as required
by law).
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uniformity and fairness within the system.
In United States v. Schipani,13 5 for example, the court held that
illegally obtained evidence procured in violation of the fourth
amendment was properly considered during sentencing even
though the evidence had been excluded from trial. In Schipani, the
defendant's first conviction for tax evasion had been reversed be-
cause of the improper admission during trial of evidence obtained
by illegal wiretapping. On retrial, the defendant was convicted
without the use of such evidence. A severe sentence was imposed:
three years imprisonment on each of five counts with sentences
running concurrently, in addition to a fine of $2500 on each of the
five counts. The severity of the defendant's sentence was due in
large measure to the perception that he was a "professional crimi-
nal," a perception created by evidence procured through the illegal
wiretaps originally excluded from trial.1 86 In reaching its decision,
the appellate court addressed the conflict between the exclusionary
rule and the rule favoring broad access to information on sentenc-
ing. The court stated that the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose
of discouraging unconstitutional searches and seizures by law en-
forcement authorities would not be enhanced by a second applica-
tion of the rule during sentencing. The court found it unlikely that
authorities would gather evidence illegally to effect a greater sen-
tence, when such evidence would be inadmissible to prove guilt.137
The case of United States v. Lee' s8 agreed with the holding in
Schipani. During sentencing for a conviction of illegal possession
of a firearm, information regarding a prior state court conviction
for possession of heroin was admitted, even though the heroin con-
viction had been reversed on appeal. The reversal resulted because
probable cause for the defendant's arrest was lacking, rendering il-
legal the search incident to that arrest. The Lee court stated that
illegally obtained evidence is not necessarily unreliable, and that
exclusion of such evidence at the initial trial stage was meant to
fulfill deterrence goals.'39 The Lee court also noted that extending
the exclusionary rule to the sentencing stage would have an insig-
nificant deterrent effect because law enforcement authorities con-
135. 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Baratta, 360 F. Supp. 512
(D.C.N.Y. 1973) (sentencing judge considered at sentencing a report which indicated an ad-
mittedly unlawful entry and search of defendant's home).
136. 435 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1970).
137. Id. at 28.
138. 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1976).
139. Id. at 1211.
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duct searches and seizures for purposes of prosecution and convic-
tion, not for purposes of enhancing sentences. In addition, the
court found that extending the exclusionary rule to sentencing
would severely delay the proceedings because the evidence must be
subjected to hearings to determine the legality of police activity in
gathering the information. These complications could discourage
sentencing judges from relying on broad and wideranging sources
of information in the interest of expediency and in order to avoid
fourth amendment challenges. These harmful side effects, accord-
ing to the Lee court, could easily be avoided by not applying the
exclusionary rule to sentencing.14
The Lee decision upheld a prior opinion of the same circuit in
Armpriester v. United States,4 in which the court had held that
a statement made by the accused while illegally detained, and oth-
erwise inadmissible at his trial, could be used at his sentencing
proceeding. 4" The Armpriester court noted that no additional evi-
dence had resulted from the accused's statement because the po-
lice possessed, prior to the statement, evidence sufficient to induce
the accused to plead guilty. In dictum, however, the court stated
that evidence so obtained should not normally be used even at
sentencing. 14 8
Conversely, the case of Verdugo v. United States'44 held that
evidence illegally obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth
amendment rights could have been obtained for the specific pur-
pose of enhancing sentence rather than for merely prosecutorial
purposes. In Verdugo, police officers conducted an illegal warrant-
less search of the defendant's home at a time when they possessed
sufficient evidence to prosecute on narcotics sales charges. 4  The
140. Id. at 1211-12.
141. 256 F.2d 294 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958).
142. Armpriester v. United States, 256 F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
856 (1958). The McNabb-Mallory Rule established the inadmissibility of statements taken
from an accused during a period of illegal detention where a delay occurred in bringing the
accused before a federal magistrate. See supra note 134.
143. 256 F.2d at 297. See 540 F.2d 1205, 1212. See also United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338 (1974) (illegally obtained evidence may be considered by grand jury); United States
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (illegally obtained confession may be used for impeachment if
voluntary); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (only defendant who was a vic-
tim of search may challenge admission of seized evidence).
144. 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971).
145. The evidence sufficient for conviction had been gathered through controlled "buys"
by narcotic agents from the defendant. The agents, therefore, had much to gain and little to
lose by conducting the unlawful search. If the evidence were suppressed at trial, the defen-
dant could still be convicted and his sentence could be enhanced if the evidence were al-
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purpose of the search was to uncover an amount of narcotics large
enough to depict the defendant as a drug dealer, and not a person
guilty of just one narcotics transaction.
The court, in analyzing whether such illegally, obtained evidence
could be used at sentencing, observed that justification for its use
could not always derive simply from the judge's need for great lati-
tude in obtaining information from wideranging sources.' 46 In-
stead, the court extolled the deterrent value of the exclusionary
rule, even though it often justified the release of guilty persons.
This, in the court's view, was not "too great a price for insuring
observance of Fourth Amendment restraints by law enforcement
officers."' 47 The Verdugo court concluded that if the product of an
illegal search could be used to increase sentences, the exclusion of
such illegally obtained evidence at trial would have little deterrent
effect on illegal searches and seizures. According to the Verdugo
court, an exception to the exclusionary rule allowing admission of
illegally obtained evidence at sentencing could easily foster con-
scious efforts to gather such evidence. 4
The court-created prohibition of illegally obtained evidence in
the sentencing phase was also applied in United States ex rel. Riv-
ers v. Myers, 49 where following a plea of guilty to a murder charge
and entry of a death penalty the appellate court ordered a new
hearing to consider the sentence imposed. One of the defendant's
lowed at sentencing. If such evidence were held admissible by a denial of a suppression
motion, then the defendant could be convicted of an additional offense: the possession of a
large quantity of narcotics.
146. 402 F.2d at 611.
147. Id. at 611-12.
148. It might be suggested that police officers are unlikely to be concerned with the
sentence ultimately imposed, and, therefore, that excluding evidence at the sen-
tencing stage cannot serve as a substantial deterrent. But this cannot be said, even
now, of "the highly specialized unit which deals with specific kinds of offenses,
such as those associated with narcotics, which are very serious in nature, where
the investigation task is difficult, and where offenders are likely to be recidivists.
Here, there may, indeed, be a specific police objective of lengthy incarceration,
since the specialized unit may consider premature release of the offender back
into the community as making more difficult their job." Ohlin & Remington, Sen-
tencing Structure: Its Eflect upon Systems for the Administration of Criminal
Justice, 23 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., 494, 501 (1958). And even if it were true
that there is now no general consciousness of the potential utility of illegally
seized evidence to enhance sentence, we could not ignore the fact that announce-
ment of an exception to the exclusionary rule would inevitably produce it (foot-
notes omitted).
Id. at 612.
149. 384 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1967).
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two confessions had been illegally obtained and admitted against
him. The Myers court found that the tainted confession appeared
more damaging than the one properly obtained and, thus, might
have been a factor in the sentencing decision.
In step with Myers, the Third Circuit in United States ex rel.
Brown v. Rundle"'5 held that sentencing procedures lacked due
process where a confession, which was inadmissible at trial, was
entered during sentencing as part of the background information
considered by the sentencing judge. The judge gave weighty con-
sideration to material adverse to the defendant that was not ad-
missible during the guilt determination stage. The case was re-
manded for resentencing.
The need for firm guidance in this most sensitive area is essen-
tial. Although the ability of the sentencing judge to examine as
much background material as possible must be preserved, admis-
sion of inflammatory and highly prejudicial information during
sentencing, which is clearly violative of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights and immune from any exclusionary rule, vitiates prin-
ciples of fairness and due process. Historically, concern for proce-
dural and substantive rights at the sentencing stage was assigned a
low priority. But the criminal justice system has not completed its
task if a judge's almost unfettered discretion stands as the only
real bulwark against the denial of basic rights, and conflicting in-
terpretations of constitutional safeguards prevail throughout the
various circuits. The effect of allowing at sentencing evidence that
is the product of an illegal search and seizure or improper interro-
gation is to disregard the deterrent goals of an exclusionary rule
and to endanger an accused's basic constitutional rights. This lapse
in safeguards affords the authorities an advantage in gleaning in-
formation from a person who, initially, has only been charged with
an offense. A clear and unequivocal rule, as applied in Verdugo,
should be promulgated to prevent such unfair advantage and to
control the gathering of evidence which will be used against a con-
victed offender at sentencing.
FAILURE TO PLEAD GUILTY AND EXPRESSIONS OF REMORSE
Sentence enhancement may be applied through other and
150. 417 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th
Cir. 1971) (when a trial judge relies on evidence gathered in violation of constitutional
rights, any sentence imposed thereunder will be vacated and the cause remanded for resen-
tencing without consideration of the infirm evidence).
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more subtle means. A convicted offender's attitude after the ver-
dict is reached plays an important role in the judge's final determi-
nation of sentence. The defendant's actions and behavior during
trial make lasting impressions on the judge, and may influence his
judgment when determining sentence. An effort to control the im-
permissible bases upon which sentences are imposed has led to
careful scrutiny of the weight assigned by the sentencing judge to a
defendant's failure to plead guilty initially or his lack of contrition
after a guilty verdict.
In United States v. Stockwell, " ' the district court had informed
the defendant before trial that he could be given a three-year sen-
tence if he pleaded guilty to one count of counterfeiting, but would
receive a five to seven-year sentence if convicted after electing to
stand trial. The defendant received concurrent seven-year
sentences after electing to stand trial. The Stockwell court struck
down the sentences. Analogizing this situation to imposing a
greater punishment because a defendant exercised his right to ap-
peal after reconviction, a practice condemned in North Carolina v.
Pearce,52 the Stockwell court stated that a judge may not impede
the accused's right to stand trial nor use the promise of a lighter
sentence to induce the guilty plea as a docket-clearing expedi-
ent.153 A judge may, however, consider a guilty plea in mitigation
of sentence.
Similarly, the defendant cannot be coerced into "admitting his
guilt" after conviction by using his failure to express remorse as a
factor in increasing sentence. Attempts to do so have been viewed
as violative of the defendant's fifth amendment rights. In Thomas
v. United States,'" a defendant convicted of bank robbery was
given a harsher sentence because he would not admit or "confess"
his part in the criminal activity. In reversing the sentence, the
court of appeals stated that the defendant had "paid a judicially
imposed penalty for exercising his constitutionally guaranteed
rights."1 55
151. 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1973).
152. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
153. 472 F.2d at 1187-88. See also Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Johnson v. State, 336 A.2d 113 (Md. 1975) (Maryland state case expressing dissatisfaction
with the trial judge's allusion to sentence enhancement for failure of accused to plead guilty,
citing federal precedent); see generally STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuILTY § 1.8, at
36-37 (1968).
154. 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966).
155. Id. at 946 (citing language from Note, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on
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Although in general the defendant may be protected after con-
viction from coercion to admit guilt or remorse, the same protec-
tion is not accorded in situations where the accused took an affirm-
ative role in denying his guilt at trial while testifying under oath.
The offering of perjured testimony can be considered in the sen-
tencing decision. Thus, the decision to have an accused testify at
his trial is one which requires defense counsel's most careful con-
sideration. For once the privilege against self-incrimination is
waived by testifying, the accused is subject to cross-examination
which may reveal prior conviction or other adverse and impeaching
information.
Another important issue in this area is whether the sentencing
judge may review testimony believed to be perjurous in determin-
ing sentence after conviction. United States v. Sanders"56 held
that the sentencing judge properly noted that "Sanders had obvi-
ously fabricated his defense and testified falsely at his trial, thus
committing a further crime of perjury; .. .,,n Allowing this as-
sessment to figure into the sentencing determination, however, is
tantamount to a judge concluding summarily that another crime
was committed. It amounts to levying punishment for a second
crime without the benefits and protections available at the guilt
determination stage of trial.
This problem was effectively, but perhaps not equitably, dealt
Judicial Determintion of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 220). See United States v. Garcia, 544
F.2d 681 (3d Cir,. 1976) (defendant's failure to cooperate with authorities by not disclosing
knowledge of further criminal activity of others cannot be used to deny leniency at sentenc-
ing because it would exact from the defendant the "price" of waiving fifth amendment
rights and cause him to risk further prosecution); Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir.
1975); United States v. Hopkins, 464 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
But see Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980), which allowed sentence enhance-
ment upon conviction where the defendant, after voluntarily disclosing his own drug traf-
ficking involvement, refused to further disclose names of others involved. This failure to
cooperate could not be justified on any ground of legitimate fear of retaliation or self-in-
crimination, as neither of these theories has been offered to the district court during sen-
tencing and, therefore, were not timely raised. The Court also opined that since failure to
cooperate evinces a rejection on the defendant's part of an obligation to community life, an
obligation that must be evident before rehabilitation can begin, sentence enhancement was
proper.
See also Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 469, 470 (10th Cir. 1959) (judicial discretion
was deemed broad enough to allow consideration of continuing assertions of innocence by
the defendant after conviction for sentence enhancement). This rule is significant in that it
shows the possibility of severe conflict among the circuits in this highly suspect category of
material used in consideration of sentence.
156. 435 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
157. Id. at 165.
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with in United States v. Hendrix.'58 In Hendrix, the appellant ar-
gued that to enhance a sentence because of perjured testimony al-
legedly occurring during trial amounted to conviction for an addi-
tional crime "without the safeguards of indictment and trial. ' '159
The court found, however, that this consideration was allowable in
order to preserve judicial access to information to determine
proper sentence, if based upon a rational finding by the sentencing
judge measured by a reasonable doubt standard. After holding that
such consideration was proper under certain circumstances, the
court cautioned that "perjury should not be treated as an adverse
sentencing factor unless the judge is persuaded beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that the defendant committed it."160
In United States v. Grayson,61 the Supreme Court reversed the
holding of the Third Circuit that consideration of false testimony
was improper and set forth guidelines for using false trial testi-
mony during sentencing proceedings.162 The district court in Gray-
son had perceived Grayson's defense as "a complete fabrication
without the slightest merit whatsoever, '' 11 3 and passed sentence ac-
cordingly. Relying essentially on the case of Poteet v. Fauver,'"
the Supreme Court held that Grayson's sentence could not stand.
The Court reasoned that Poteet mandated sentencing reversal if
an additional penalty were assessed because the judge believed the
convicted offender lied while testifying on the merits of a criminal
case.1" In Poteet, however, the sentencing judge assessed a higher
penalty following a colloquy with the defendant who had refused
to admit guilt after conviction. The judge in Poteet stated that he
did not believe the defendant's continued protestations of inno-
cence.1 a6 This distinction is quite important because the reliance
on Poteet in Grayson was misplaced. The Poteet decision follows a
158. 505 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974).
159. Id. at 1235.
160. Id. at 1236-37. Hendrix also provides a concise review of the holdings of other cir-
cuits and points out the dangers of imposing a "flat and unrealistic rule" disallowing all
perjury considerations. The Second Circuit opted instead for a reasonable doubt measure-
ment allowing restraint that would discourage perjury from flowing from the witness stand,
even if the standard had a "chilling effect."
161. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
162. United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1976).
163. Id. at 108.
164. 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1975).
165. See United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 1976).
166. Poteet v. Fauver, 517 F.2d 393, 395 (3d Cir. 1975).
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line of precedent 167 establishing the principle that under the fifth
amendment a defendant cannot be penalized for failing to express
remorse and for maintaining his innocence after conviction.
In contrast, the sentence imposed upon Grayson resulted from a
finding that he had testified falsely under oath at his trial. This
had been established earlier as a permissible factor to be taken
into account on sentencing.6 In announcing that perceived per-
jured testimony offered during trial may be considered during sen-
tencing, the Supreme Court relied heavily upon the Williams prin-
ciple'6 9 in according the sentencing judge full and broad
opportunity to obtain information from a variety of sources. Fi-
nally, in evaluating the permissibility of considering such evidence,
the Court rejected an "exclusionary rule" that would, in its view,
promote perjury. The Court did caution, however, that a judge
should not automatically enhance a sentence in a case where he
believes false testimony exists, but should do so only if he believes
the testimony is willfully and materially false.170 This observation
appears to approach the Hendrix'7' holding, but does not go quite
as far. In Hendrix it was determined that the sentencing judge
could consider perjured testimony only if he believed beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant had lied on the stand.
Nevertheless, as Justice Stewart stated in his dissent, the total
effect of the majority's decision was to impose a penalty upon "the
defendant's exercise of his constitutional and statutory rights to
plead guilty and to testify in his own behalf.' 7  Justice Stewart
also decried the lack of even minimal due process in this circum-
stance to avoid punishment for the additional crime of perjury. He
correctly noted that only those defendants who chose to testify and
actually did so faced the real prospect of "a greater sentence based
upon the trial judge's unreviewable perception that the testimony
was untruthful.' ' 7 3
The absence of due process limitations or safeguards increases
the possibility that a defendant's truthful testimony might be per-
ceived as false, thereby exposing him to sentence enhancement and
additional liability. This could unduly encumber his decision to
167. See supra note 155.
168. See supra notes 158-60.
169. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978).
170. Id. at 53-55.
171. 505 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974).
172. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 56 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 57.
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testify and could place him "at a serious disadvantage, as com-
pared with any other witness at trial."174 Whereas other witnesses
can be exposed to punishment for perjurous statements only after
indictment and conviction, the defendant is faced with the addi-
tional risk that his testimony, if disbelieved by the judge, may re-
sult in additional prison time. 175 Justice Stewart also disagreed
that the Williams rationale would allow a sentencing judge to en-
hance punishment merely because of his personal belief that the
defendant testified untruthfully at trial. Moreover, the justification
for allowing this practice with its attendant additional risks to the
defendant, according to Justice Stewart, pales when balanced
against such "a minimal contribution that the defendant's possibly
untruthful testimony might make to an overall assessment of his
potential for rehabilitation.' ' 7
The wisdom of Justice Stewart's arguments can be applied to
the sentencing phase in general. The convicted offender stands to
lose many rights that are guaranteed him immediately before con-
viction. The perjury issue is just one example of such a loss, albeit
a unique one, because it can curtail severely a defendant's ability
to defend himself during the guilt determination stage. Nonethe-
less, it reflects the overly broad discretionary power that pervades
the entire sentencing system in its present form, resulting in an
extreme dichotomy between controls placed upon the two phases
of the criminal trial.
The neglect of the sentencing phase has been addressed in di-
verse ways over the years and more recently in proposed federal
legislation designed to overhaul the federal criminal code. 77 These
attempts at reform, however, have failed to provide necessary safe-
guards where they are most needed. The path leading to sentenc-
ing reform thus far has been impeded, but progress has at least
begun in several areas, including the correction of sentencing dis-
parity among convicted individuals similarly situated, in the use of
prior criminal records, in reviewing the nature of the crime com-
mitted through sentencing guidelines, and in death penalty cases.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 58.
176. Id.
177. S. 2699, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (Sentencing Guidelines bill).
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APPROACHES TO CHANGE
Sentencing Guidelines Reform
Recent attempts at sentencing reform have been motivated by
severe criticism of the disparity in penalties imposed for similar
crimes upon convicted individuals with similar backgrounds and
characteristics. Also criticized is the lack of guidance for sentenc-
ing judges in imposing those penalties. The current view reflects
the need for guidelines to enable a sentencing judge to categorize
properly the background and personality information he receives
concerning the convicted offender, in order to achieve uniformity
in sentencing. This guidelines approach will greatly aid the sen-
tencing judge in rendering equitable penalties. However, it
manifests a very obvious fault in that it fails to outline, from an
evidentiary standpoint, what items of information the sentencing
judge may consider in categorizing the offender.
The sentencing guidelines operate only after the offender has
been "individualized" by the trial judge in the sentencing stage;
but it is precisely that part of the process in the criminal justice
system that requires revision. The unsettling dilemma of quality
control remains. Sentencing guidelines without evidentiary stan-
dards allow a result to be reached without the controlled input
necessary to insure a cohesive, well-structured system of penalty
application.
Sentencing Commission
An alternative proposal to reform the sentencing phase which
has received various legislative endorsements is the creation of a
sentencing commission. This concept has been proposed as both a
separate legislative reform vehicle and as part of a larger attempt
at recodification of the federal criminal code.M The sentencing
commission is hailed as the best alternative to sentencing reform
because it would create an independent agency designed expressly
178. A proposal for the creation of such an agency has been submitted repeatedly to
Congress by its strongest proponent, Senator Kennedy. Senator Kennedy has also written
several articles on the subject. See, e.g., Kennedy, Commentary - the Federal Criminal
Reform Act and New Sentencing Alternatives, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 423 (1980); Kennedy,
Federal Criminal Code: An Overview, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451 (1979); Kennedy, Toward
a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law with Order, 16 Am. CRIM. L. Rev. 353 (1979);
Kennedy, Criminal Sentencing: A Game of Chance, 60 JUDICATURE 208 (1976). But see
Pauley, An Analysis of Some Aspects of Jurisdiction Under S. 1437, the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code, 47 GEO. WAsH. L. Rev. 475 (1979); Quigley, The Federal Criminal Code
Revision Plan: An Epitaph for the Well-Buried Dead, 47 Gao. WASH. L. Rev. 459 (1979).
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for establishing sentencing guidelines for judges. The commission
would draw upon individuals from each branch of the criminal jus-
tice system, including judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, correc-
tions personnel, lay persons and legislators in selecting its mem-
bers.' 19 This group would represent a composite of sentencing
"experts" with a broad spectrum of viewpoints, thereby avoiding
the advocacy of a particular bias or philosophy of sentencing. The
duties of these commissioners would include collecting data on cur-
rent sentencing techniques and procedures with a view toward de-
fining sentencing parameters. These parameters would be based
upon identifying and categorizing serious crimes as well as ques-
tions of substance, such as recidivist differentiation, aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, and the ranking of serious crimes. 80
The creation of this commission would go far in alleviating sen-
tencing disparity concerning the amount of prison time imposed.' 8'
In addition, the commission would help to insure fairness and con-
sistency in the imposition of such penalties. However, as in the
proposals concerning sentencing guidelines, there is a serious lack
of consideration given to the qualitative aspect of the sentencing
phase. No provision is made for proscriptions on the kind of infor-
mation'that a sentencing judge may consider before he turns to the
sentencing guidelines to determine an appropriate sentence. With-
out providing for these evidentiary considerations, current sentenc-
ing reform proposals treat only half the problem confronting the
sentencing morass that currently exists.
Amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32
Another move toward reform is currently pending in the form of
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,"" and particularly rule 32. The proposed changes attempt to
179. See generally M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, LAW WITHOUT ORDER 119 (1973):
The proposed commission would be a permanent agency responsible for (1) the
study of sentencing, corrections, and parole; (2) the formulation of laws and rules
to which the studies pointed; and (3) the actual enactment of rules subject to
traditional checks by Congress and the courts. The third is emphasized not be-
cause of a claim to novelty, but because it is thought to be especially important if
the commission is to be an effective instrument of reform rather than a storage
place. (emphasis in original).
180. R.G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUITY AND DESERT 62-63
(1979).
181. See generally supra note 178.
182. See generally supra note 7. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
908 [Vol. 13
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clarify some convoluted and ambiguous applications of rule 32
through: (1) a determination by the sentencing judge as to whether
the defendant and his counsel have had an opportunity to review
the presentence report;1 8 3 (2) a requirement that the sentencing
judge allow the defendant and his counsel to read the complete
Judicial Conference of the United States (October, 1981).
183. The proposed changes to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 provide:
Rule 32. Sentence and Judgment
(a) SENTENCE.
(1) Imposition of Sentence. Sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable de-
lay. Before imposing sentence the court shall
(A) determine that the defendant and his counsel have had the opportunity to
read and discuss the presentence investigation report made available pursuant
to subdivision (c)(3) (A) or summary thereof made available pursuant to subdivi-
sion (c)(3)(B);
(B) afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant; and
(C) address the defendant personally and ask him if he wishs to make a state-
ment in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment.
The attorney for the government shall have an equivalent opportunity to speak
to the court.
Id. at 45.
The Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1) provides:
Subdivision (a)(1) has been amended so as to impose upon the sentencing court
the additional obligation of determining that the defendant and his counsel have
had an opportunity to read the presentence investigation report or summary
thereof. This change is consistent with the amendment of subdivision (c)(3), dis-
cussed below, providing for disclosure of the report (or, in the circumstances indi-
cated, a summary thereof) to both defendant and his counsel without request.
This amendment is also consistent with the findings of a recent empirical study
that under present rule 32 meaningful disclosure is often lacking and "that some
form of judicial prodding is necessary to achieve full disclosure." Fennell & Hall,
Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of
Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1613, 1651 (1980).
The defendant's interest in an accurate and reliable presentence report does not
cease with the imposition of sentence. Rather, these interests are implicated at
later stages in the correctional process by the continued use of the presentence
report as a basic source of information in the handling of the defendant. If the
defendant is incarcerated, the presentence report accompanies him to the correc-
tional institution and provides background information for the Bureau of Prisons'
classification summary, which, in turn, determines the defendant's classification
within the facility, his ability to obtain furloughs, and the choice of treatment
programs.
The presentence report also plays a crucial role during parol determination. Sec-
tion 4207 of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act directs the parole
hearing examiner to consider, if available, the presentence report as well as other
records concerning the prisoner. In addition to its general use as background at
the parole hearing, the presentence report serves as the primary source of infor-
mation for calculating the inmate's parole guideline score.
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report with nondisclosure of those items pertaining to diagnoses
for rehabilitation, confidential opinions or information that might
cause harm to the defendant or others; and, (3) a requirement that
the sentencing authority make a definitive ruling on each chal-
lenged factual inaccuracy relied upon in sentencing or specifically
advise the defendant or counsel that no reliance will be placed
upon the particular items challenged in imposing sentence. 8 4 The
Though it is thus important that the defendant be aware now of all these poten-
tial uses, the Advisory Committee has considered but not adopted a requirement
that the trial judge specifically advise the defendant of these matters. The Com-
mittee believes that this additional burden should not be placed upon the trial
judge, and that the problem is best dealt with by a form attached to the
presentence report, to be signed by the defendant, advising of these potential uses
of the report. This suggestion has been forwarded to the Probation Committee of
the Judicial Conference.
Id. at 49-50.
184. The proposed changes to rule 32 further provide:
(c)(3)(D) If the comments of the defendant and his counselor testimony or other
information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence
investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall,
as to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a
determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controvertd
will not be taken into account in sentencing. A- written record of such findings
and determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the
presentence investigation report thereafter made available to the Bureau of Pris-
ons or the Parole Commission.
Id. at 47-48.
The Advisory Committee Note for this section provides:
Subdivision (c)(3)(D) is entirely new. It requires the sentencing court, as to each
matter controverted, either to make a finding as to the accuracy of the challenged
factual proposition or to determine that no reliance will be placed on that proposi-
tion at the time of sentencing. This new provision also requires that a record of
this action accompany any copy of the report later made available to the Bureau
of Prisons or Parole Commission.
As noted above, the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission make sub-
stantial use of the presentence investigation report. Under current practice, this
can result in reliance upon assertions of fact in the report in the making of critical
determinations relating to custody or parole. For example, it is possible that the
Bureau or Commission, in the course of reaching a decision on such matters as
institutional assignment, eligibility for programs, or computation of salient fac-
tors, will place great reliance upon factual assertions in the report which are in
fact untrue and which remained unchallenged at the time of the sentencing be-
cause defendant or his counsel deemed the error unimportant in the sentencing
context (e.g., where the sentence was expected to conform to an earlier plea agree-
ment, or where the judge said he would disregard certain controverted matter in
setting the sentence).
The first sentence of new subdivision (c)(3)(D) is intended to ensure that a re-
cord is made as to exactly what resolution occurred as to controverted matter. The
second sentence is intended to ensure that this record comes to the attention of
the Bureau or Commission when these agencies utilize the presentence investiga-
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amendment also provides for comment by the defendant and his
counsel and allows the court to exercise discretion in permitting
the introduction of testimony. or other material relative to factual
inaccuracies allegedly contained within the report.185
These new and enlarged provisions are the benchmarks of an en-
lightened and realistic outlook promoting application of due pro-
cess to the sentencing procedure. The change outlined in rule
32(c)(3)(D) is especially important because it provides a kind of
exclusionary device by allowing the convicted offender to object to
certain adverse material. The judge may then grant a ruling as to
the "usability" of such' information or at least assure the defendant
tha, absent a factfinding presentation, the information will not be
considered. This particular provision may also resolve the current
conflict regarding the application of the Tucker principle,'88 in
that a defendant may at sentencing protect the use of a prior con-
viction obtained in violation of his sixth amendment rights. The
various circuits have interpreted the applicability of this principle
differently. An exhaustion of state remedies may be required
before the defendant will be granted relief in the federal courts on
a habeas corpus petition. 8 7 The conflicting view that has evolved
would not require the offender to resort to such exhaustion of rem-
edies prior to federal court relief. 88 Under the proposed rule
change, it appears that the federal sentencing court would be re-
quired to decide the validity of prior convictions before using them
in sentencing considerations. In addition, the convicted offender
would receive the benefit of challenging an allegedly defective, un-
counseled conviction prior to its erroneous use in determining his
sentence, or at least be assured of its nonuse without having to
raise the challenge later after incarceration. This procedure would
tion report. In current practice, "less than one-fourth of the district courts
(twenty of ninety-two) communicate to the correctional agencies the defendant's
challenges to information in the presentence report and the resolution of these
challenges." Fennell & Hall, supra at 1680.
New subdivision (c)(3)(D) does not impose an onerous burden. It does not even
require the preparation of a transcript. As is now the practice in some courts,
these findings and determinations can be simply entered onto a form which is
then appended to the report.
185. Id. at 46-47.
186. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
187. Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973). See supra notes 127-30 and
accompanying text.
188. United States v. Lipscomb, 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972). See supra notes 125-26
and accompanying text.
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help eliminate the possibility of the offender being denied federal
relief if he had not exhausted state remedies by overturning the
conviction in the jurisdiction in which it was obtained.
The amendments as outlined, however, should not be viewed as
a panacea to correct all potential abuses that can occur at the sen-
tencing stage. Nevertheless, these proposals would go a long way in
correcting excesses and would assist in providing a large measure
of procedural protection to the convicted offender in lieu of a de-
finitive exclusionary rule. The proposed procedures would afford
the convicted offender the opportunity to conduct inquiries suffi-
cient to dispel misconceptions and correct misinformation when
the need arose, and would allow the parties to subpoena, confront
and cross-examine persons who offer adverse information that has
been challenged as inaccurate. Providing an adequate record of the
sentencing proceedings is also required by these proposed amend-
ments and is supported by previous recommendations on that
subject. 8' e
189. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PRocEDuRs
§ 18-6.4 (1980). See also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUsTICE STANDARDS
AND GoALS, CORRECTIONS, Standard 5.17 (1973), which provides:
Sentencing Hearing-Rights of Defendant: Sentencing courts should adopt imme-
diately the practice of holding a hearing prior to imposition of sentence and
should develop guidelines for such hearing reflecting the following.
1. At the hearing the defendant should have these rights:
a. To be represented by counsel or appointed counsel.
b. To present evidence on his own behalf.
c. To subpoena witnesses.
d. To call or cross-examine the person who prepared the presentence report
and any person whose information, contained in the presentence report,
may be highly damaging to the defendant.
e. To present arguments as to sentencing alternatives.
2. Guidelines should be provided as to the evidence that may be considered by the
sentencing court for purposes of determining sentences, as follows:
a. The exclusionary rules of evidence applicable to criminal trial should not
be applied to the sentencing hearing, and all evidence should be received
subject to the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evi-
dence. However, sentencing decisions should be based on competent and
reliable evidence. Where a person providing evidence of factual information
is reasonably available, he should be required to testify orally in order to
allow cross-examination rather than being allowed to submit his testimony
in writing.
b. Evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights
should not be considered or heard in the sentence hearing and should not
be referred to in the presentence report.
c. If the court finds, after considering the presentence report and whatever
information is presented at the sentence hearing, that there is a need for
further study and observation of the defendant before he is sentenced, it
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THE MILITARY MODEL
Presently, within the federal system there exists a parallel sub-
system of criminal justice that should not be ignored. Advances in
this area are both enterprising and intelligent and can serve as a
model to the entire network of federal criminal justice. This sys-
tem, known as military justice, is the body of law developed to gov-
ern and provide jurisdiction over offenses committed by those in
the armed forces. Historically, the military system has viewed the
sentencing segment of the criminal tribunal as an adversarial pro-
ceeding.190 Although discretion is granted the sentencing authority,
may take necessary steps to obtain that information. This includes hiring of
local physicians, psychiatrists, or other professionals; committing the defen-
dant for no more than 30 days to a local or regional diagnostic center; and
ordering a more complete investigation of the defendant's background, so-
cial history, etc.
Id. at 190.
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS,
Standard 5.19 (1973) provides:
Imposition of Sentence.
Sentencing courts immediately should adopt the policy and practice of basing all
sentencing decisions on' an official record of the sentencing hearing. The record
should be similar in form to the trial record but in any event should include the
following:
1. A verbatim transcript of the sentencing hearing including statements made
by all witnesses, the defendant and his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney.
2. Specific findings by the court on all controverted issues of fact and on all
factual questions required as a prerequisite to the selection of the sentence
imposed.
3. The reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed.
4. A precise statement of the terms of the sentence imposed and the purpose
that sentence is to serve.
5. A statement of all time spent in custody or under supervision for which the
defendant is to receive credit under Standard 5.8.
6. The record of the sentencing hearing should be made part of the trial record
and should be available to the defendant or his counsel for purposes of appeal.
The record also should be transmitted to correctional officials responsible for the
care or custody of the offender.
Id. at 195.
190. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES 75-76 (rev. ed. 1969). Under these
procedures, the prosecution and defense may present matters to aid the court, a military
judge sitting alone, or a court with members (jury), in determining the type and amount of
punishment to be imposed. Provision is also made for rebuttal evidence to be presented by
either side. Id. at I 76e. Argument on sentencing is permitted. Id. at I 76f. The defense is
also specifically allowed to introduce matters of extenuation and mitigation. Id. at I 75c(1).
Statements of the accused, along with personnel data, from the defendant's records are al-
lowed, with the defense having the right to correct any inaccuracies contained therein. Id. at
75b(1). Evidence of previous convictions may be admitted against the convicted offender,
however, any conviction from a prior courts-martial may only be admitted if the offenses
relate to those committed during the six years preceding commission of any offense of which
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it is subject to strict limitations, including maximum punishments
allowable for a particular offense.' 9 ' In addition to procedures out-
lined for the sentencing phase itself, a very worthwhile and far
reaching plan was recently completed when the Military Rules of
Evidence became effective. This task was accomplished after a
two-year effort, performed and completed pursuant to executive
order.1" 2 The Military Rules of Evidence, which now control trial
proceedings under the military justice system, provide a compre-
hensive scheme of formalized applications of rules derived from
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Many of the standard rules cur-
rently utilized in the federal civilian system applicable to trials in
the federal district courts were directly assimilated with appropri-
ate adaptations to specific military requirements.9 3
Although fashioned after the Federal Rules of Evidence, the mil-
itary model made a significant departure in applying evidentiary
rules to sentencing.' 94 The Military Rules of Evidence provide that
rules governing admissibility of material at the guilt determination
phase are relaxed, rather than disregarded, in the sentencing
phase. 9 5 This one distinction has accomplished much in the way of
the offender stands convicted. Id. at I 75b(2).
191. Id. at 11 76a(1)-(5).
192. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNrrED STATES (rev. ed. 1969), app. 18, at A 18-1
(1980). See Exec. Order No. 12,198, 3 C.F.R. 151 (1981).
193. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969), app. 18 (1980)
provides:
The Executive Order substitutes the Military Rules of Evidence for the present
rules of evidence found in Chapter XXVII and prescribes numerous conforming
changes. The Military Rules of Evidence are taken in large part from the Federal
Rules of Evidence but include specific privilege rules and a partial codification of
the law of self-incrimination, confessions and admissions, search and seizure, and
eyewitness identification. The change substantially changes present law in numer-
ous respects. Particularly significant are new rules for mental examinations, Rule
302, intrusive body searches, Rule 312, and inspections, Rule 313.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969), app. 18, at A 18-2 provides:
The decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals and of the Courts of
Military Review must be utilized in interpreting these Rules. While specific deci-
sions of the Article III courts involving rules which are common both to the Mili-
tary Rules and the Federal Rules should be considered very persuasive, they are
not binding; see Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. It should be
noted, however, that a significant policy consideration in adopting the Federal
Rules of Evidence was to ensure, where possible, common evidentiary law.
194. MiL. R. EVID., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNrrE STATES (rev. ed. 1969), § XI:
"Rule 1101. Applicability of Rules . . .(c) Rules Relaxed. The Application of these rules
may be relaxed in sentencing proceedings as provided under paragraph 75c and otherwise as
provided in this Manual."
195. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d): "Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to
privileges) do not apply in the following situations: ...(3) Miscellaneous Proceedings ...
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due process guarantees afforded a defendant who appears before a
military tribunal. By employing relaxed evidentiary rules at sen-
tencing, some form of control operates on the admission of adverse
material without fully sacrificing the wide discretion of the sen-
tencing authority. This is a compatible blend that can serve as a
prototype for proper procedures for all criminal trials.196
The military model has preserved for the sentencing phase pro-
cedures conducive to the fair administration of justice. These rules
add a new dimension and refinement to a most important part of
the criminal proceeding, merely by allowing rules already promul-
gated concerning the admissibility of adverse information at trial
to be applied to the sentencing stage. This procedure is clearly in
keeping with the demands of fairness in so sensitive an area as
sentencing.
CONCLUSION
Subjecting the non-capital sentencing phase of the criminal trial
to strict and formalized evidentiary standards is a task not easily
accomplished and one not readily amenable to quick solutions or
unreasoned thought. The concern for full due process rights, crimi-
nal procedural rules, and rules of evidence at the guilt determina-
tion stage fades once initial accusation is transformed into convic-
tion. Instead of closely regulated burdens of proof and elemental
allocations, the sentencing phase is guided principally by judicial
discretion. The only exception is found in some judicially created
standards affecting the admissibility of information in a few nar-
row areas. In addition, nonuniformity exists among the federal cir-
cuits in almost every aspect of sentencing, from disclosure of the
presentence report to a convicted offender's challenge regarding
the use of a prior invalid, uncounseled conviction. Although sen-
tencing is a critical stage in the criminal proceeding, the courts are
left to grapple with the diverse and conflicting standards that have
arisen. The vast differences in evidentiary standards between the
two trial phases have created an imbalance that promotes dispa-
Sentencing. .... "
196. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1969), app. 18 at A 18-20:
(c) Rules Relaxed. Rule 1101(c) conforms the rules of evidence to military sen-
tencing procedures as set forth in Manual I 75c. Courts-martial are bifurcated
proceedings with sentencing being an adversarial proceeding. Partial application
of the rules of evidence is thus appropriate. The Rule also recognizes the possibil-
ity that other Manual provisions may now or later affect the application of the
rules of evidence.
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rate sentences based upon loosely guided foundations.
The sentencing guidelines system and the creation of a sentenc-
ing commission to aid sentencing judges in determining punish-
ment are concerned chiefly with a quantitative reevaluation of the
current system. In order to achieve complete sentencing reform,
qualitative analysis is indispensable. The proposed amendments to
rule 32 portend the shifting tide in realizing sentencing goals by
allowing the convicted offender more access to adverse information
and by granting him the opportunity to challenge it. The Military
Rules of Evidence offer an example, already in practice, of the way
in which rules of evidence may be successfully applied to the sen-
tencing stage.
The goals of current criminal code and sentencing reform will be
more fully realized by the recognition that evidentiary standards
have a purposeful place in the sentencing phase of the criminal
trial. If these steps are not taken, however, current sentencing re-
form will provide merely a treatment of the symptoms of sentenc-
ing disparity, but will not perfect a cure.
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